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Author: Street Cop Training

It’s Not Just a Gun Necklace

If I were to ask you to make a list of the major tools of policing today I would bet that your list would likely include a radio, handcuffs, taser/oc spray, body armor, a flashlight— or 4, and of course a gun and a holster. Those last two practically go together as one item. There are some crazy policies out there, but so far every policy I’ve seen has some sort of leather or plastic to hold their pistol. If you know an agency going full Yukon Cornelius, I need photos.

We have another tool that has taken a firm hold in this profession that doesn’t seem to receive the same attention as the pistol— the AR-15. We would be creating tremendous issues for ourselves if we just tried to carry around our pistols without a holster, but we tolerate ineffective slings for our rifles, or even no sling at all. The sling is one of the most overlooked pieces of equipment that we can put on our rifles. I would argue it’s as important, and deserves as much consideration, as the light and optic we mount on the gun. The sling isn’t just a piece of nylon we use as a gun necklace so our rifle doesn’t fall when we let it go. It’s a key part of unlocking all of the functionality of our rifle if we have to deploy it.

The first task of the sling most applicable to policing is control of the rifle when not being actively employed. It should keep it secured to our bodies, stable in its stored position, and conveniently accessible in case it needs to be redeployed. We don’t want our rifle falling on the ground if we have to let it go. It shouldn’t be swinging around knocking us in the knees and “sensitive” areas. And we should be able to grab it intuitively, just like drawing your pistol. It should be where you left it. This disqualifies the single-point sling entirely. I understand, there’s still much love for single points. But unless you and your MP5 are guarding The Crown, single points don’t have a place on fighting rifles. 

You need your sling to be able to keep the muzzle deflected away from things that don’t need guns pointed at them. Dangling freely isn’t an effective way to make that happen.

If you still have a 3-point sling all I can say is leave that extra material back with incandescent flashlights. Our current evolution of 2-point slings is the optimum solution for weapon control, especially with the on-the-fly adjustability that’s become readily available in the last decade. It allows you to keep the muzzle pointed where you want it if you don’t have a hand on the gun. It protects your knees from front sights and flashlights, and it offers a key advantage when firing the rifle— positional stability.

Some of you familiar with sling-supported shooting are probably imagining gentlemen in funny jackets shooting old wood and iron fighting rifles they likely carried in their youth. Slow cadence of fire, extended ranges, and iron sights, the way God intended(so I’m told). Using a sling to increase the stability of the rifle is a long-standing rifleman skill that applies not only to M1 Garands at 600 meters; the modern patrol officer that locks a carbine in their car on duty can take advantage of the same principles that your local high power shooter does.

There are better men than me like Ryan Cleckner and Kyle Lamb, who have chapters dedicated in their books to sling use. I’ll sum up my article simply. A two-point sling is an enabler that comes at a low cost and is readily available. The VTAC, Blue Force Gear GMT, Magpul MS1, and similar two-point slings have been excellent performers. It’s a low-cost investment that will dramatically improve your rifle shooting. Don’t let your rifle be a forgotten piece of equipment. Give it the attention it deserves.

Rural Policing

Rural policing is in a world all to itself. Overshadowed by major metropolitan areas that spend the entire shift with calls stacked. Officers move from one call to the next with almost no break and no time for proactive policing. When people think of rural policing, they think of Mayberry and the Dukes of Hazzard. I know I did before I got involved with a rural agency. I did not expect pursuits, counter-drug enforcement, interdiction, and leadership that support a proactive mindset. Move over Barney, the modern rural deputies, and officers of 2022 are out there making a difference. In a big way. I moved to South Dakota thinking I’d be Deputy Fife, boy howdy was I wrong.

Being a rural deputy in the Midwest has changed a lot over the past 10 years. With more and more law enforcement concentrating on interstates, major highways near populated areas, and urban expanses, criminals are adapting. Drug and weapon traffickers are taking to the back roads and rural highways to avoid detection. Human traffickers as well are finding their way off the main roads and into these smaller communities. The same reasons people are leaving the cities to find a more quiet and less expensive life are the same reasons criminals are following.

Now, that is not to say that rural law enforcement is dealing with more and more calls. On the contrary, the call volume for most agencies by comparison is very low. Some agencies can go weeks without more than a couple of calls. This plays right into the stigma that rural cops have it easy and don’t put in a lot of work. There may be some truth to that, but the narrative is changing. Having fewer reactive calls means more opportunities for proactive policing. Rural interdiction is going to be the way forward going into the next decade.

This is where a lot of gaps can be bridged as far as training and experience with rural and metro policing. Rural agencies have the time and resources, but most lack the training. In the not-to-distant past interdiction training is centered around cities and populated areas. This is starting to change. We are now starting to see a large uptick in rural agencies taking proactive steps for better training. More grants exist now than ever before.  There is a lot of opportunities to get involved. Some of these agencies have less than 5 law enforcement officers working in an area that spans thousands of square miles. These agencies are making quality stops that lead to major shipments being seized.

With these seizures, more and more money is being allocated for training, equipment, and technology. This attracts a different kind of officer to seek employment in these areas. The cost of living is low, the wages are high, and the community support is astounding. The people love seeing law enforcement putting vehicles on the shoulder and taking money and resources from criminals. In a time when our profession is seen to be a stain on society, the people here love what we do. That is a benefit that cannot be put into monetary terms.

I moved to North-Central South Dakota to be Barney. I thought it would be laid back, easy, and not much of a challenge. I thought it would be a good way to see if being a cop was something I wanted to do. I am now part of a Multi-jurisdictional Criminal Enforcement team. I have constant opportunities to learn and train in interdiction and proactive policing. My leadership supports the mission of proactive policing. They go out of their way to ensure we have the tools, time, and training to make it happen. Our courts and the community support what we are doing.

Rural policing is the future and the future is bright.

The Art of Reflective Light

There’s a simple method to “turn on the lights” in any room without having to find the light switch. It’s called reflective lighting, and it can greatly improve your building searches. Reflective light occurs when a light source is pointed at any light-colored surface such as a bounce board or reflector. When the light bounces off the surface, it causes a larger spill than its original source, filling in dark shadows and creating an even flow of light. It can be used in conjunction with slicing the pie as well as dynamic entry.

Utilizing reflective light is simple, and here’s how we can use it to take advantage of our often-unknown environment on the job. The color of the ceiling is white in the majority of rooms we enter. We can use that as an advantage in a similar way to how photographers reflect light. One of the most common things you’ll see in a photographer’s kit is a reflector. A white ceiling or wall can serve as a reflector to bounce a wide spill of light that fills the room. Rather than pointing our light sporadically all over the room, we can point it up and get an effect similar to turning the lights on. We can now overcome our tunnel-vision barrier of following our beam’s hot spot and begin to identify movement.

Once you pick up movement or a person, you now have the option of continuing to monitor the whole room with reflective light, or threat-focusing our light directly on the subject in question. You can still pie a room, then move to reflective light to better receive the new space and watch for threats. 

Tunnel vision can be a real problem with traditional scanning. Our eyes like to follow lasers, and just like the laser, our eyes will submit to tunnel vision with the flashlight beam. It’s also harder to ID movement while your light itself is moving. You can even create false movement by shifting shadows of objects in the room.  This creates a lot of extra information for your mind to sort through. Reflective light allows us to gather a lot more information without constantly reshaping the environment.

Reflective light doesn’t stop at handheld flashlights. There are products designed to assist you with reflective light like the Thyrm Variarc™. The Variarc allows you to angle your ballistic helmet light upward and get reflective light pouring all over the room with white light and IR illuminators.

If you’re new to reflective light, give it a try. Let us know how you feel about the technique in the comments.

Patrick Lyoya: Not Most People

 On April 4th, 2022, Patrick Lyoya was stopped by police. His license plate did not match the vehicle he was driving. To us in law enforcement, this puts us on alert. Not everyone understands why so let me break it down as best that I can. There are many reasons why plates may not match, and most of them are not honest mistakes. Instead, they are criminal violations, such as a stolen vehicle. So to find out why we need to make a stop and ask questions. Lyoya’s stop was for this reason.

When the police stop you, most people stay in their vehicle. It makes us very nervous when someone steps out of their car without us asking them to do so. Maybe they are going to run? Perhaps they are going to attack us with a weapon? I have had people exit the vehicle for various reasons, and honestly, none of them were with ill intent. I told them to please stay in the car, and they returned with no problem. Lyoya exited the vehicle and did not listen to the officer’s request to return to his car. Lyoya instead shut the car door and walked in the officer’s direction.

Folks are generally not happy to be stopped, and I empathize with that. Most people ask what’s the reason for the stop, so we tell them. We ask for a driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Some are grumpy, some are nervous, and others are apologetic. But they hand over their license. Lyoya said his driver’s license was in his vehicle. The officer told him to get his license, but what did Lyoya do? He opened the door, spoke to a passenger, shut the door, and started to walk away. The officer told him to stop and place his hands behind his back. What did Lyoya do? He shoved the officer and tried to run away.

So we have a vehicle with illegal plates. The driver refuses to identify himself and is not following instructions given to him by law enforcement. Lyoya is using force to escape the investigative detention by shoving the officer. The driver attempts to flee the scene and escape the lawful stop by running away. None of which are what reasonable people do during a vehicle stop.

The officer then uses force to try and get control over Lyoya. Let me be blunt; force is not pretty. Force is downright ugly. As the officer attempts to gain control over Lyoya, he gives instructions. Lyoya locks his arms and refuses to comply. It may not be hitting but Lyoya is using force. The officer delivers a few knee strikes to Lyoya to get compliance. Most people do not run from a vehicle stop. They instead want to avoid conflict. Generally speaking people want to get the stop over with and either deal with a fine or a warning.. Lyoya was not like most people.

While the officer was attempting to gain control over Lyoya, he gave clear instructions. Lyoya responded, “Okay,” but he did not follow the officer’s instructions. Saying “okay” while still actively resisting the officer is not complying. Now bystanders begin closing in on the officer’s location. The officer is alone. He is struggling with a suspect, and people are approaching him. He has to take control of the suspect. The officer puts his entire body weight on Lyoya to gain control. Lyoya does a pushup like the officer is not even there, ignoring the officer’s instructions. Lyoya stands up. The officer tries to get Lyoya to put his arms behind his back for handcuffing. Lyoya verbalizes that he is following commands, yet his arms are pulling forward, and he is still actively resisting and trying to escape the officer.

Lyoya breaks free of the now exhausted officer. The officer draws his taser and deploys it, and it does not work. Lyoya instead tries to take the taser from the officer. The officer tells Lyoya to let go of the taser. Lyoya refuses. Out of breath and still struggling to control Lyoya, the officer is out of options. If he loses control over the taser, the once unarmed Lyoya becomes armed. The officer draws his weapon and tells Lyoya a final time to drop the taser; Lyoya refuses, and as a result, the officer had no other choice.

Lyoya dictated everything that happened after he was stopped. The officer was reacting and responding to Lyoya’s actions. Unfortunately, Lyoya made poor decisions and chose violence. The officer had every right to defend himself and keep himself safe. Out of thousands of contacts made by law enforcement officers each day, this is not what most people do

Unconventional Duty Gear

Being a law enforcement officer means knowing your equipment inside and out. The more experience and training you have, the more you learn what you need. We need primary tools to protect ourselves, such as our vest and other PPE (Personal Protective Equipment). We have communication devices, defensive tools, weapons, and the trusty pocket knife. In addition, we have multi-tools as well as other gadgets that would make Batman envious. So here are some unconventional tools that officers should consider having in their patrol vehicle or go-bag.

Dog Biscuits – You will encounter a pooch or two throughout your career. I would wager that most dogs are friendly. They want attention from the new human that just walked into their lives. So having a few dogs treats handy to give out to friendly dogs makes you seem like a good and genuine person. You are not only building rapport with the dog; you are establishing credibility with everyone around you. Some people form strong opinions over how people treat animals.

Of course, not every pup encounter will go well. Sometimes we encounter dogs that are aggressive, scared, injured, or simply unpleasant. I was recently dispatched to a welfare check on an older Marine veteran. He had a dog named Ace, and Ace was like something out of a cartoon. He barked, snarled, and stared at me with his one good eye. Ace’s other eye looked like it was right out of the Edgar Allen Poe story, “The Tell-Tale Heart.” His personality was as charming as Cujo. You get the idea. Ace is the sort of dog you don’t turn your back on. Lucky for me, I keep dog biscuits in a pocket on my vest. Medical was able to enter the scene, the Marine got the care he needed, and I made a new friend.

Moist Towelettes – Even before Covid’s fears swept the nation, it has always been a good practice to keep Wet Naps or Wet Ones in your kit. Constantly we are put into situations where we have to touch and be around gross things and people. I am sure we ALL always remember to glove up when we need to (sarcasm) so let’s focus on other applications of these lifesavers. /having the ability to wipe down equipment, your uniform, and boots after a particularly nasty situation keeps you looking professional. It also helps prevent infectious diseases spread by blood-borne pathogens and other bodily fluids.
There is a good community policing aspect to using moist towelettes; Being able to offer someone the means to clean themselves goes a long way. It helps restore dignity and shows that you respect them as an individual. I remember dealing with a young man in crisis that others in my agency had dealt with before. It was summertime, and he had been walking along a county road all night and well into the morning. I stopped and started to speak with him, offering him water and a few Wet Ones. I still run into him from time to time, and he remembers that encounter.

Water Bottles
– Of course, water bottles are suitable for us to keep hydrated. They serve the public as well when we deal with them. It costs very little to throw a case of water into your vehicle, and it is well worth the return on the investment. I offer water to almost everyone I encounter. Good, bad, or indifferent. There is the apparent hydration aspect. A water bottle can go a long way in getting some mutual respect. Offering someone the means to rinse off their hands or face or give them a cool drink on a summer day can turn the tide for an officer. If you still insist on carrying OC spray and don’t carry water in your vehicle, are you even a human being?


Cigarettes – I know that it’s 2022, and everyone is fully aware of the dangers and health risks. However, a good chunk of the people we deal with smoke. I know quite a few officers that smoke as well. It is a habit that I once partook in, but have since kicked. I do still keep smokes in my vehicle. I know most smokers you encounter, good or bad, will have their own. Offering one of your own to them will go a long way in building rapport. It also serves to slow people down. It’s not necessarily the cigarette itself. They are slowing down their breathing to inhale and exhale the smoke. Approach this case-by-case and follow your policies. I just know having a pack on hand has helped diffuse enough situations that I see value in having them around.

I was dealing with a man that had trouble keeping his hands to himself during an argument with his spouse. I offered him water, and he told me to go self-fornicate. It was blistering hot outside, and he had none of what I was saying. He wanted to fight. He knew what was going to happen. I knew what was going to happen. Even the neighbors knew what was going to happen. So I offered him a cigarette. He took a deep breath, his posture changed from hostile to docile, and he licked his now drier than the Sahara lips. “Ya, and can I get that water too?” He went calmly into handcuffs and in the back of my vehicle.

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)

Syllabus

On the strength of a complaint for a search warrant based on an informant’s statements that he had observed tinfoil packets on the person of a bartender and behind the bar at a certain tavern and that he had been advised by the bartender that the latter would have heroin for sale on a certain date, a judge of an Illinois state court issued a warrant authorizing the search of the tavern and the person of the bartender for “evidence of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.” Upon entering the tavern to execute the warrant, police officers announced their purpose and advised those present that they were going to conduct a “cursory search for weapons.” The officer who searched the customers felt what he described as “a cigarette pack with objects in it” in his first pat-down of appellant, one of the customers. The officer did not then remove this pack from appellant’s pocket but, after patting down other customers, returned to appellant, frisked him again, retrieved the cigarette pack from his pants pocket, and found inside it six tinfoil packets containing heroin. After appellant was indicted for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress the contraband seized from his person at the tavern. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the search had been conducted under the authority of an Illinois statute which empowers law enforcement officers executing a search warrant to detain and search any person found on the premises in order to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described in the warrant. Appellant was convicted, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional in its application to the facts of this case.

Held: The searches of appellant and the seizure of what was in his pocket contravened the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp.  444 U. S. 90-96.

(a) When the search warrant was issued, the authorities had no probable cause to believe that any person found in the tavern, aside from the bartender, would be violating the law. The complaint for the warrant did not allege that the tavern was frequented by persons illegally purchasing drugs or that the informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern purchase drugs from the bartender or any other person. 

Page 444 U. S. 86

And probable cause to search appellant was still absent when the police executed the warrant; upon entering the tavern, the police did not recognize appellant and had no reason to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any offense. The police did possess a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern where appellant happened to be when the warrant was executed, but a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.  Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40,  392 U. S. 62-63. Although the warrant gave the officers authority to search the premises and the bartender, it gave them no authority to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern’s customers. Pp.  444 U. S. 90-92.

(b) Nor was the action of the police constitutionally permissible on the theory that the first search of appellant constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, and yielded probable cause to believe that appellant was carrying narcotics, thus justifying the second search for which no warrant was required in light of the exigencies of the situation coupled with the ease with which appellant could have disposed of the illegal substance. A reasonable belief that a person is armed and presently dangerous must form the predicate to a pat-down of the person for weapons. Here, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that appellant was armed and dangerous. Pp.  444 U. S. 92-93.

(c) The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments will not be construed to permit evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on “compact” premises subject to a search warrant, even where the police have a “reasonable belief” that such persons “are connected with” drug trafficking and “may be concealing or carrying away the contraband.”  Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581. Pp.  444 U. S. 94-96.

58 Ill.App.3d 57, 373 N.E.2d 1013, reversed and remanded.

STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p.  444 U. S. 96. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p.  444 U. S. 98. 

Page 444 U. S. 87

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WYOMING

No. 98-184. Argued January 12, 1999-Decided April 5, 1999

During a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket, which the driver admitted using to take drugs. The officer then searched the passenger compartment for contraband, removing and searching what respondent, a passenger in the car, claimed was her purse. He found drug paraphernalia there and arrested respondent on drug charges. The trial court denied her motion to suppress all evidence from the purse as the fruit of an unlawful search, holding that the officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband, and, by extension, any containers therein that could hold such contraband. Respondent was convicted. In reversing, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that an officer with probable cause to search a vehicle may search all containers that might conceal the object of the search; but, if the officer knows or should know that a container belongs to a passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search unless someone had the opportunity to conceal contraband within it to avoid detection. Applying that rule here, the court concluded that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Held: Police officers with probable cause to search a car, as in this case, may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. In determining whether a particular governmental action violates the Fourth Amendment, this Court inquires first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under common law when the Amendment was framed, see, e. g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 931. Where that inquiry yields no answer, the Court must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional reasonableness standards by balancing an individual’s privacy interests against legitimate governmental interests, see, e. g., Vernonia School Dist. -‘+ 7 v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 652-653. This Court has concluded that the Framers would have regarded as reasonable the warrantless search of a car that police had probable cause to believe contained contraband, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, as well as the warrantless search of containers within the automobile, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798. Neither Ross nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a distinction based on ownership. The analytical principle underlying Ross’s rule is also fully consistent with the balance of this

296

Syllabus

Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Even if the historical evidence were equivocal, the balancing of the relative interests weighs decidedly in favor of searching a passenger’s belongings. Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property they transport in cars. See, e. g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590. The degree of intrusiveness of a package search upon personal privacy and personal dignity is substantially less than the degree of intrusiveness of the body searches at issue in United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85. In contrast to the passenger’s reduced privacy expectations, the governmental interest in effective law enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the ability to search the passenger’s belongings, since an automobile’s ready mobility creates the risk that evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant is obtained, California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386; since a passenger may have an interest in concealing evidence of wrongdoing in a common enterprise with the driver, cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413-414; and since a criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passenger’s belongings as readily as in other containers in the car, see, e. g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 102. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s “passenger property” rule would be unworkable in practice. Finally, an exception from the historical practice described in Ross protecting only a passenger’s property, rather than property belonging to anyone other than the driver, would be less sensible than the rule that a package may be searched, whether or not its owner is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it might contain the object of the search. Pp. 299-307.

956 P. 2d 363, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 307. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p.309.

Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General of Wyoming, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gay Woodhouse, Acting Attorney General, and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

Syllabus

In a trial in a Federal District Court without a jury, petitioners were convicted of fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment of illegally imported heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §174. Although the Court of Appeals held that the arrests of both petitioners without warrants were illegal, because not based on “probable cause” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment nor “reasonable grounds” within the meaning of the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, it affirmed their convictions, notwithstanding the admission in evidence over their timely objections of (1) statements made orally by petitioner Toy in his bedroom at the time of his arrest; (2) heroin surrendered to the agents by a third party as a result of those statements; and (3) unsigned statements made by each petitioner several days after his arrest, and after being lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance. The Court of Appeals held that these items were not the fruits of the illegal arrests, and, therefore, were properly admitted in evidence.

Held:

1. On the record in this case, there was neither reasonable grounds nor probable cause for Toy’s arrest, since the information upon which it was based was too vague and came from too untested a source to accept it as probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant; and this defect was not cured by the fact that Toy fled when a supposed customer at his door early in the morning revealed that he was a narcotics agent. Pp.  371 U. S. 479-484.

2. On the record in this case, the statements made by Toy in his bedroom at the time of his unlawful arrest were the fruits of the agents’ unlawful action, and they should have been excluded from evidence. Pp.  371 U. S. 484-487.

3. The narcotics taken from a third party as a result of statements made by Toy at the time of his arrest were likewise fruits of the unlawful arrest, and they should not have been admitted as evidence against Toy. Pp.  371 U. S. 487-488. 

Page 371 U. S. 472

4. After exclusion of the foregoing items of improperly admitted evidence, the only proofs remaining to sustain Toy’s conviction are his and his codefendant’s unsigned statements; any admissions of guilt in Toy’s statement require corroboration; no reference to Toy in his codefendant’s statement constitutes admissible evidence corroborating any admission by Toy, and Toy’s conviction must be set aside for lack of competent evidence to support it. Pp.  371 U. S. 488-491.

5. In view of the fact that, after his unlawful arrest, petitioner Wong Sun had been lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance and had returned voluntarily several days later when he made his unsigned statement, the connection between his unlawful arrest and the making of that statement was so attenuated that the unsigned statement was not the fruit of the unlawful arrest and, therefore, it was properly admitted in evidence. P.  371 U. S. 491.

6. The seizure of the narcotics admitted in evidence invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial. Pp.  371 U. S. 491-492.

7. Any references to Wong Sun in his codefendant’s statement were incompetent to corroborate Wong Sun’s admissions, and Wong Sun is entitled to a new trial, because it is not clear from the record whether or not the trial court relied upon his codefendant’s statement as a source of corroboration of Wong Sun’s confession. Pp.  371 U. S. 492-493.

288 F.2d 366, reversed and cause remanded.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)

Syllabus

WHREN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 95-5841. Argued April 17, 1996-Decided June 10, 1996

Plainclothes policemen patrolling a “high drug area” in an unmarked vehicle observed a truck driven by petitioner Brown waiting at a stop sign at an intersection for an unusually long time; the truck then turned suddenly, without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. The officers stopped the vehicle, assertedly to warn the driver about traffic violations, and upon approaching the truck observed plastic bags of crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested. Prior to trial on federal drug charges, they moved for suppression of the evidence, arguing that the stop had not been justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers’ traffic-violation ground for approaching the truck was pretextual. The motion to suppress was denied, petitioners were convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. Pp. 809-819.

(a) Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See, e. g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 659. Petitioners claim that, because the police may be tempted to use commonly occurring traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue. However, this Court’s cases foreclose the argument that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct justified on the basis of probable cause. See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 221, n. 1,236. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Pp. 809-813.

(b) Although framed as an empirical question-whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from standard police practices-petitioners’ proposed test is plainly designed to combat the perceived danger of pretextual stops. It is thus inconsistent with this Court’s cases, which

807

make clear that the Fourth Amendment’s concern with “reasonableness” allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 236. Nor can the Fourth Amendment’s protections be thought to vary from place to place and from time to time, which would be the consequence of assessing the reasonableness of police conduct in light of local law enforcement practices. Pp. 813-816.

(c) Also rejected is petitioners’ argument that the balancing of interests inherent in Fourth Amendment inquiries does not support enforcement of minor traffic laws by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles, since that practice only minimally advances the government’s interest in traffic safety while subjecting motorists to inconvenience, confusion, and anxiety. Where probable cause exists, this Court has found it necessary to engage in balancing only in cases involving searches or seizures conducted in a manner unusually harmful to the individual. See, e. g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1. The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice. pp. 816-819.

53 F.3d 371, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Lisa Burget Wright argued the cause for petitioners.

With her on the briefs were A. J. Kramer, Neil H. Jaffee, and G. Allen Dale.

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States.

On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Paul A. Engelmayer. *

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Steven R. Shapiro and Susan N. Herman; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Natman Schaye and Walter B. Nash III.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joan Killeen and Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and Christina V. Kuo, Deputy Attorney General; and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware,

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)

Syllabus

On the night of April 24, 1978, a witness observed a car that was being driven erratically and that eventually swerved off the road, coming to a stop in a field without causing damage to any person or property. Ignoring the witness’ suggestion that he wait for assistance in removing his car, the driver walked away from the scene. The police arrived a few minutes later, and were told by the witness that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. After checking the car’s registration, the police, without obtaining a warrant, proceeded to the petitioner’s nearby home, arriving at about 9 p.m. They gained entry when petitioner’s stepdaughter answered the door, and found petitioner lying naked in bed. Petitioner was then arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of a Wisconsin statute which provided that a first offense was a noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200. Petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathanalysis test. Pursuant to Wisconsin statutes, which subjected an arrestee who refused to take the test to the risk of a 60-day revocation of driving privileges, petitioner requested a court hearing to determine whether his refusal was reasonable. Under Wisconsin law, a refusal to take a breath test was reasonable if the underlying arrest was not lawful. The trial court, ultimately concluding that petitioner’s arrest was lawful and that his refusal to take the breath test was therefore unreasonable, issued an order suspending petitioner’s license. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the order, concluding that the warrantless arrest of petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.

Held: The warrantless, nighttime entry of petitioner’s home to arrest him for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense, was prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. Pp.  466 U. S. 748-754.

(a) Before government agents may invade the sanctity of the home, the government must demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. An important factor to be considered when determining 

Page 466 U. S. 741

whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, application of the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense has been committed. Pp.  466 U. S. 748-753.

(b) Petitioner’s warrantless arrest in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal traffic offense cannot be justified on the basis of the “hot pursuit” doctrine, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime, or on the basis of a threat to public safety, because petitioner had already arrived home and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident. Nor can the arrest be justified as necessary to preserve evidence of petitioner’s blood alcohol level. Even assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, given the fact that the State had chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment was possible, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner’s blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. Pp.  466 U. S. 753-754.

108 Wis.2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 245, vacated and remanded.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.  466 U. S. 755. BURGER, C.J., filed a separate statement, post, p.  466 U. S. 755. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p.  466 U. S. 756.

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008)

certiorari to the supreme court virginia

No. 06–1082. Argued January 14, 2008—Decided April 23, 2008

Rather than issuing the summons required by Virginia law, police arrested respondent Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license. A search incident to the arrest yielded crack cocaine, and Moore was tried on drug charges. The trial court declined to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Moore was convicted. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation.

Held: The police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or when they performed a search incident to the arrest. Pp. 3–13.

   (a) Because the founding era’s statutes and common law do not support Moore’s view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate statutes, this is “not a case in which the claimant can point to a ‘clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since,’ ” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 345. Pp. 3–5.

   (b) Where history provides no conclusive answer, this Court has analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300. Applying that methodology, this Court has held that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable.  Atwater, supra, at 354. This Court’s decisions counsel against changing the calculus when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level required by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 35.  United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, distinguished. Pp. 6–8.

   (c) The Court adheres to this approach because an arrest based on probable cause serves interests that justify seizure. Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation. A State’s choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules. Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and variable from place to place and time to time. Pp. 8–11.

   (d) The Court rejects Moore’s argument that even if the Constitution allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him. Officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218. While officers issuing citations do not face the same danger, and thus do not have the same authority to search, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, the officers arrested Moore, and therefore faced the risks that are “an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification,” Robinson, supra, at 235. Pp. 11–13.

272 Va. 717, 636 S. E. 2d 395, reversed and remanded.

   Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. (2016)

Syllabus

UTAH v. STRIEFF

certiorari to the supreme court of utah

No. 14–1373. Argued February 22, 2016—Decided June 20, 2016

Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug activity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieff what he was doing at the house. He then requested Strieff’s identification and relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who informed him that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him, and found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the evidence suppressed.

Held: The evidence Officer Fackrell seized incident to Strieff’s arrest is admissible based on an application of the attenuation factors from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 . In this case, there was no flagrant police misconduct. Therefore, Officer Fackrell’s discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest. Pp. 4–10.

(a) As the primary judicial remedy for deterring Fourth Amendment violations, the exclusionary rule encompasses both the “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” and, relevant here, “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.”  Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 . But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by the rule’s substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the rule. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586 . Pp. 4–5.

(b) As a threshold matter, the attenuation doctrine is not limited to the defendant’s independent acts. The doctrine therefore applies here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant. Assuming, without deciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to his arrest. Pp. 5–10.

(1) Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 , lead to this conclusion. The first, “temporal proximity” between the initially unlawful stop and the search, id., at 603, favors suppressing the evidence. Officer Fackrell discovered drug contraband on Strieff only minutes after the illegal stop. In contrast, the second factor, “the presence of intervening circumstances, id., at 603–604, strongly favors the State. The existence of a valid warrant, predating the investigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors finding sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence. That warrant authorized Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff, and once the arrest was authorized, his search of Strieff incident to that arrest was undisputedly lawful. The third factor, “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,” id., at 604, also strongly favors the State. Officer Fackrell was at most negligent, but his errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights. After the unlawful stop, his conduct was lawful, and there is no indication that the stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. Pp. 6–9.

(2) Strieff’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, neither Officer Fackrell’s purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rises to a level of misconduct warranting suppression. Officer Fackrell’s purpose was not to conduct a suspicionless fishing expedition but was to gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. Strieff conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. Second, it is unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to dragnet searches by police. Such misconduct would expose police to civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown’s “purpose and flagrancy” factor. Pp. 9–10.

2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3d 532, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.